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ABSTRACT 
The concept of mission assurance was developed so that technical, implementation, and management practices could 
be enabled to increase mission success of otherwise irrecoverable spacecraft. Understanding and implementing the 
mission assurance trade space for small satellites is important to improve success rates, tackle more challenging 
missions while managing expectations, scope missions, and minimize oversight burden that inhibits innovation. 
Small satellites generally selectively pick and choose, or completely ignore, the majority of the activities defined in 
Class A-D because constraints are an equally driving force and strongly compete with mission objectives. Further, 
government funded small satellite missions almost always fall under Class D, but they often create some tailored 
assurance profile that generally does not meet the intent of Class D, nor does Class D suffice for the realities of most 
small satellite missions. 
This paper organizes assurance profiles into a structure that better represents the current status by accounting for the 
constraint – mission objective trade space of small satellites. The new infrastructure focuses on studied and 
implemented practices that produce successful missions. These practices include: a well-defined scope that balances 
constraints and objectives, significant time dedicated to testing at all levels, and lessons-learned-design principles.
WHY A NEW MISSION ASSURANCE 
DEFINITION? 
Mission Assurance is a mature field for the space 
enterprise. The satellite community has invested 
heavily in understanding what constitutes ensuring 
mission success on-orbit, which has enabled 
unparalleled capabilities in space. Standards for parts 
traceability, environmental testing, and other practices 
and processes have been well researched and 
incorporated into the aerospace industrial base (e.g. 
Class A-D systems). This has resulted in operational 
systems lasting well beyond their required design life in 
many cases. These have also caused the perception that 
space systems should always work. 
The emerging challenge over the last 10 years has been 
the tension between needing/wanting more from fielded 
technology at reduced costs, compounded with the 
expectation of more rapid technology refresh timelines. 
Terrestrially, this is a well understood phenomenon 
enabled by effects such as Moore’s Law and manifested 
in cyclic product releases such as smartphone release 
schedules. In space, these effects are slowed because of 
factors such as technical challenges (i.e. radiation), 
programmatic challenges (i.e. the cost of launch) or 
cultural challenges (i.e. space systems are scoped 
around large platforms). 
Contradictory expectations have emerged where there is 
a need for more capability in cheaper and faster 
timelines. There exists an underlying assumption that 
has evolved over the last number of decades that these 
systems cannot fail. While space systems are generally 
high reliability, failures have happened either due to 
launch or spacecraft issues (Figure 1). The last several 
decades of space systems have been in the range of 
90% success rate (mission owner accepted outcome 
without considering it as a failure). With the advent of 
small satellites, missions have been approached with a 
much greater dynamic range of assurance practices and 
definition of success (often with success as simply 
being communications). It is often assumed that higher 
assurance practices yield higher mission success rates. 
Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that one product of accepting 
a wider variety of risk profiles might also be greater 
variation in mission success. Still, there is no direct 
correlation between higher risk and higher failure rate, 
nor does this explicitly show how mission risk profile 
(and associated assurance practices) relate to mission 
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success/failure. This paper posits that the use, and 
potential acceptance, of this greater dynamic range 
allows for systems to increase mission and 
technology capability at reduced timelines and cost. 
Not all small satellites need follow the constraint driven 
model, but instead follow the requirements-driven 
model. This paper focuses on the constraint approach.  
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Vehicle1-5 and Launcher6 Success (DOA = dead on arrival)
Small satellites have pushed major development in the 
philosophy and implementation of mission assurance. 
Originally the focus in small satellite assurance was on 
simply ignoring the standards all together or tailoring 
from traditional core standards such as MIL-HDBK-
3437 (now cancelled). In order to make small satellites 
relevant and useful as more than just educational tools, 
a balance must be struck between doing nothing and 
traditional standards. 
It is becoming clear that programmatic constraints, 
combined with technical requirements, must be 
considered together to fully embrace the dynamic 
assurance/success range available to programs today. 
Small satellites take advantage of standardized launch, 
re-usable components (i.e. “commoditized” avionics), 
and aggressively scoping programs to fit within 
constraints allowing for better cost and schedule 
utilization. Intricately tied into this is a relaxing of 
traditional mission assurance methods.  
Understanding how to better define the relaxation of 
traditional mission assurance is at the core of defining a 
new mission assurance paradigm. Cost and schedule are 
often the key driving factors; however, understanding 
what technical practices and processes should be 
leveraged in these riskier categories is important, along 
with implementation of a reduced approval authority 
structure. Having criteria for the classes enables 
programs to understand the risk posture for a program 
clearly and allows program managers to bound proper 
expectations for leadership and stakeholders. This is 
critical to helping prevent leadership from wanting a 
low risk (i.e. higher dollar, longer schedule, etc.) 
program, with the lower funding profile (and shorter 
schedule, etc.) of a high risk mission.  
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While many programs have expressed the desire to take 
advantage of the increased dynamic range, they lack 
either the technical knowledge or the programmatic 
authority, even though driving policy such as U.S. 
national priorities and the Space Enterprise Vision8 
encourage increasing capabilities at a faster pace. This 
paper attempts to define the present state of small 
satellite mission assurance, which does not conform to 
the old Class A-D paradigm (Figure 2), so that technical 
and programmatic practices can be more clearly 
understood. 
 
Figure 2: High-level concept for how new classes augment the existing mission assurance architecture
 
The SmallSat Gap: Non-Class A-D Missions 
There is significant definition and literature on mission 
classification at NASA9, the DOD7, and across the 
aerospace industry10. As described in NPR 8705.4, the 
risk classification level should be defined and agreed 
upon by various parties. Class D has consistently been 
the bin into which small satellites have been placed. 
This has been done because Class D has elements that 
have technical risks that are medium by design and 
many credible mission failure mechanisms may exist11.  
It has constantly been shown that multiple requirements 
of Class D do not match the needs of many small 
satellites because they are too restrictive and do not 
allow mission-by-mission variability. Small satellites 
often ignore the majority of the activities defined in 
Class A-D because constraints are an equally driving 
force and strongly compete with mission objectives. 
With the state-of-the-art in the small satellite industry 
and funding these missions receive, small satellite 
producers often create tailored assurance profiles. The 
tailored profiles do not meet the intent of Class D, nor 
does Class D suffice for the realities of most small 
satellite missions.  
DEFINITION OF A NEW SMALL SATELLITE 
MISSION ASSURANCE PHILOSOPHY 
There are two key concepts that are essential to the new 
framework. First, and somewhat independent from 
mission assurance (MA), proper scoping of small 
satellite missions is fundamental to successful small 
satellites3. This has been expressed by a concept 
familiar to the small satellite community: constraint 
versus objective/requirement driven missions. 
Requirements driven missions (in a puritanical 
definition) keep their objective/requirements as-is and 
continue to design/refine technology until those 
objectives are met. In the constraint driven model, 
objectives/requirements are more fluid and need to 
bend much more as the true capability of, and 
constraints on, the system is understood. In essence, a 
constraint-driven mission fits within the capability 
“box”, whereas an objective/requirements driven 
mission has a “box” made for it. A balance must be 
struck between stakeholders and engineers which 
recognizes bias towards constraint-driven scoping and 
holds to that posture once agreed upon. Without this, 
success is substantially harder and scope creep can 
drive up resource utilization without significant 
increase to the return of the mission. (In spacecraft like 
this, it can take time to understand the constraint space 
and sometimes re-scoping/reducing mission objectives 
is necessary to produce a more tangible mission given 
other constraints; this is a healthy and common 
outcome to keep within defined limitations.) 
Second, good engineering is not replaced by mission 
assurance. Often, good engineering practice is 
contained within many MA practices, but here MA is 
seen as a check-and-balance to the engineering process. 
Further, all missions are designed for full mission 
success; the amount of mission assurance can 
provide a level of confidence in mission success. If a 
mission is not designed for full mission success, either 
the design is flawed or the scope is poorly formed. 
Conversely, a mission may have high fidelity design 
and proceed through well accepted engineering 
processes (i.e. the system engineering “V”), however 
the mission assurance profile may still follow low 
assurance. It should be emphasized that this does not 
mean the mission will not fully succeed, but that 
confidence in performance to achieve success is less 
characterized. 
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Figure 3 shows the proposed constraint driven branch 
for mission assurance. There are three major constraints 
considered in this new architecture and they are 
discussed in greater detail below.  
 
Figure 3: Architecture of constraint driven mission assurance
Approval Authority and Programmatic 
Implementation 
Programmatic constraints (Figure 3) are often the most 
driving for many small satellite missions because they 
are expected to be relatively fast and cheap. 
Independent of expectations, the reality is that lower 
cost and shorter schedule programs often drive the 
mission assurance profile lower, i.e. to less 
characterized system performance. As programmatic 
constraints relax, more assurance practices can be 
implemented. A program’s approval authority (AA) is 
considered the convening body that accepts/rejects 
risks, passes/fails a program at reviews, etc. Conversely 
to programmatic constraints, as a program’s AA moves 
up an organization’s structure, this often drives mission 
assurance higher. While technical practices might not 
improve, oversight and the amount of review does 
increase. Finally, the technical implementation can 
drive mission assurance both higher and lower. Should 
there be little new technology, higher state of 
integration, or lower system complexity, technical 
assurance may not need to be as rigorous, especially to 
counter balance any AA or programmatic constraints. 
However, challenging designs and missions can push 
some practices to being more rigorous.  
 
Upon program/mission inception, the 
stakeholders/leadership and designers should have 
an honest conversation about whether the mission is 
requirements or constraint driven and understand 
the trade space the program is to operate within. 
The following section focuses on technical 
implementation but ties some programmatic and 
approval constraints into a potential taxonomy for small 
satellites. 
Technical Implementation 
Currently, small satellite mission assurance practices 
seem to fall into four major categories as shown in 
Table 1. These categories consider the demonstrated 
level of functionality (i.e. mission assurance) increasing 
in scope from “Do No Harm” up to Full Success. While 
this is far from a true specification for how mission 
assurance should be performed, Table 1 seems to 
represent the present state of the industry and provides 
a framework for describing small satellites' assurance 
practices. 
The taxonomy presented in Table 1 provides a means to 
discuss assurance based upon demonstrated capability 
with engineers and stakeholders. Using the level of 
demonstrated capability teams can provide a level of 
confidence, and credibility, for where designs are well 
vetted, and where they have had less characterization 
i.e. the demonstrated level-of-integration risk 
assessment. 
Table 1: Small satellites' Program Risk Taxonomy with some example design and test practices 
Demonstrated Level 
of Capability 
Implication Example Practices 
Do No Harm DOA is ok (education and/or fully 
constrained and not requirement driven) 
Vibration testing, bake out, inhibit design review/test, range safety 
measures demonstrated, no RF transmission within 45 minutes of 
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Demonstrated Level 
of Capability 
Implication Example Practices 
deployment/no attitude maneuvers within 15 minutes, 25 year 
deorbit. Reviews: informal peer, launch readiness. Approval 
Authority (AA): Program 
Survival Not DOA (power + low-rate comm). 
May have no higher level functionality 
(All of the above), possibly designing power/comm for tumble, 
long range communications testing with ground station has been 
completed(1), complete charge/discharge cycle testing 
completed(2), TVAC. Reviews: informal peer, may have 
stakeholder. AA: Program 
Minimum 
Functionality 
Min. Mission Success. Mission 
Recoverable in event of fault: 
Ex: LEOPS/start up 
Ex: Maintain Formation 
(All of the above), full command execution test(3), startup/POR 
DitL testing(4), Sun-point test(5), other mission specific tests 
demonstrating survival functionality, mission specific FTA & 
Self-EMC test, thermal analysis. Reviews: informal-SCR, PDR, 




Full Mission Success. Full Functionality (All of the above), environmental characterization and flow down 
into requirements (i.e. radiation), full functional and limited 
performance testing, more detailed FTA & FMEA (flight, ground, 
GSE), SPF analysis/redundancy, requirement development to at 
least L2 and V&V. Reviews: formal-SCR, PDR, CDR, TRR, 




Full Mission Success. Full Functionality (All of the above), full functional and performance testing, Worst 
Case Analyses & design. NPR 8705.4, TOR-2011(8591)-21 
 
Because each mission has its own challenges, the 
practices described in Table 1 are examples (driven by 
previous experience) but are not ubiquitous. Part of 
constraint-driven mission assurance has been to allow a 
building block application of the various practices 
(defined by References 9 and 10) as is most critical to 
reduce risk on a given mission. An example of this 
approach is a high power mission might focus on power 
and thermal parts derating, worst case analyses, etc., but 
focus less on vehicle FMECA, FTA, requirements 
validation, etc. Another example to move faster and 
incur less expense is to show more detailed systematic 
capability but not subsystem/component. 
In Table 1 the lowest assurance in the taxonomy is “Do 
No Harm”. This is, at its core, not concerned with the 
direct functionality of the vehicle and therefore dead on 
arrival (DOA) is possible and may be acceptable 
relative to assuring the mission succeeds, and NOT 
the quality of the engineering behind the design. 
Programs here focus on ensuring the small satellite does 
not harm the primary spacecraft, the other secondary 
spacecraft on the launch vehicle, and deorbits on time. 
This includes demonstrating proper power inhibit 
architecture, as well as bake-out testing and vibration 
testing. Review and oversight is left to the team or local 
program control even if funding is provided from 
outside. 
The next level in the taxonomy focuses on gaining 
confidence that the vehicle is capable of surviving some 
or all vehicle configurations, including tumble (which 
all small satellites do), and therefore can communicate 
with the ground. This assurance posture does not focus 
on gaining confidence in whether the mission will 
complete but it does focus more on ensuring the vehicle 
will make it to orbit alive and is robust enough to 
survive unexpected and off-nominal cases. Essentially, 
“if the vehicle is alive, there is hope.” Mission 
assurance practices focus more on ensuring the 
telecommunications and power systems are robust and 
that basic functionality of the main computer/software 
can support this. Review and oversight may include 
more stakeholder/customer interaction; however, 
overall go/no-go authority still resides with the 
program. 
The following level transitions to improving confidence 
that the minimum mission is achieved. Again, the 
“minimum mission” definition is a scoping exercise, 
but if done well, very clear criteria can be made. 
Therefore, this style of mission assurance profile can be 
properly built. Here, not only does the mission do no 
harm and survive, but the design is demonstrated to 
have a recoverable mission even in off-nominal 
situations. This can require a significant amount of 
design and mission assurance applied in some cases, 
e.g. a formation where drift is a driver for the mission. 
Recovery time may need to be low to recover the 
formation, therefore assurance practices are leveraged 
to reduce failure modes and minimize outage. This 
level rolls in more design and testing practices from the 
traditional A-D classes as well as best practices 
(discussed below in the Best Practices section and in 
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Reference 3). Review and oversight starts to include 
more traditional review structures, albeit in an informal 
manner with authority to proceed not necessarily 
dictated by some/all the traditional reviews. Authority 
for the mission comes not from the direct program 
office but the next level higher. 
Next, mission assurance practices are followed that 
provide confidence that the mission may meet full 
mission success. It should be emphasized that this is 
still a constraint driven (fitting in the box) architecture, 
therefore the mission assurance practices are also 
constraint driven. It is quite possible that this style of 
mission spends significant time in testing for full 
functional and performance testing of the payload(s) 
and vehicle instead of utilizing more analysis, higher 
reliability, etc. to demonstrate that the mission has a 
higher probability of full success. Review and oversight 
includes formal reviews (that can be tailored to the 
specific mission’s needs) as key decision 
points/authority to proceed and these judgements are 
provided at the next higher level of the overall 
organization. 
Beyond this point, the standard Class D - A profiles 
exist and are the transition point to capability driven 
missions. (For comparison Table 2 shows the Class D 
definition and how the new taxonomy generally is 
different.)  
Table 2: SMA Related Requirements for NASA 
Class D9 Related to New Taxonomy 
 Class D New Taxonomy 
Single Point 
Failure 
Critical SPFs (for Level 
1 requirements) may be 
permitted but are 
mitigated by use of high 
reliability parts, 
additional testing, or by 
other means. Single 
string and selectively 
redundant design 
approaches may be used 
Critical SPFs are 
permitted and may 
be accepted or 






or by other means. 
EM, FM, etc. Limited engineering 
model and flight spare 
hardware 
Pending identified 
risks and risk 
profile, may utilize 
prototypes, 
engineering models, 




Testing required only for 
verification of safety 
compliance and interface 
compatibility. 
Acceptance test program 
for critical performance 
parameters 
Testing required for 
verification of 
safety and interfaces 
but may expand all 
the way to full 
performance 
EEE Parts Class A, Class B, or 
Class C requirements, 









reliability risk trade 
Reviews Center level reviews with 
participation of all 
applicable directorates. 
May be delegated to 
Projects. Peer reviews of 
software requirements 
and code 
As defined by 
mission profile. 
PDR, CDR, PSR are 
common reviews. 
Peer reviews are 
encouraged for all 
elements 
Safety Per all applicable NASA 
safety directives and 
standards 





Materials Requirements are based 
on applicable safety 
standards. Materials 
should be assessed for 
application and life limits 








based on applicable 
safety requirements. 
Analysis of interface 
As defined by 
Program's 
organization. There 
may be no specific 
reliability 
requirements 
Fault Tree Fault tree analysis 
required for safety 
critical functions 
Often informal, 
conducted for ``do 
no harm'' 
requirements, or 
only key elements 
PRA (NPR 
8705.5) 
Safety only. Other 
discretionary 
applications 




Requirements based on 
applicable safety 
standards 
As defined by 
Program's 
organization. There 







reporting and corrective 
action, configuration 
management, GIDEP 
failure experience data 
and NASA Advisory 
process. Other 
requirements based on 
applicable safety 
standards 
As defined by 
Program's 
organization. There 
may be no specific 
requirements 











Program. Risk reporting 
to GPMC 
Conducted for 
mission as integral 
part of constraint 
definition but may 
not follow NPR 
8000.4. Lower level 
risks tracked 
informally or by 
Program's 
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During all mission 
critical events to assure 
data is available for 
critical anomaly 
investigations to prevent 
future recurrence 





Note that while elements such as radiation/radiation 
hard parts and COTS parts qualification receive a lot of 
attention, these elements of mission assurance are often 
less cost effective than a multi-iteration development 
cycle that emphasizes testing. This is because a 
significant portion of small satellite hardware is 
untested or un-vetted, including payloads. Our 
experience has shown that a rapid development and test 
architecture produces more successful results for this 
class of spacecraft. Small satellites have a relatively 
high infant mortality risk that can be mitigated by 
rigorous testing to catch flaws prior to launch. 
However, if there are technical risks identified for a 
given design or mission, greater design assurance, 
reliability engineering, parts planning, etc. may be 
adopted to mitigate those risks. Robustness, i.e. the 
removal of single point failures and/or redundancy, is 
another way to mitigate risks. However this is difficult 
given mass and volume constraints and the 
complexities added to the system to handle increased 
robustness often introduce their own problems. Adding 
robustness through graceful degradation of systems is 
generally more successful for small satellites. 
Case Studies 
USE CASE 1: Transitioning from requirement to 
constraint driven assurance. 
A new small satellite mission is conceived and expected 
to depart from Class D assurance requirements in 
several ways. Recognizing this, the team asks the 
question “why?” They identify numerous constraints 
such as allowable schedule, cost, available component 
maturity, launch availability and team experience. 
These constraints are then, in some cases, prioritized as 
equal to or more driving to the implementation than the 
science or technology mission objectives. Having 
greater clarity on identified constraints, the team allows 
the development and AI&T process to go forward in a 
“best effort” mindset with the given resources available.  
While one approach could have been to seek waivers 
for Class D deviations, the team recognizes that given 
the number of deviations for the mission, it is unclear at 
what point the spirit and intent of Class D is lost and 
along with it the confidence that the mission would 
have succeeded to the same level indicated in Figure 1 
or Figure 2. In the constraint driven construct, the small 
satellite mission team has taken advantage of the ability 
to identify the minimum level of activity needed to 
increase confidence and meet expectations in achieving 
varying degrees of spacecraft functionality below full 
mission success. In contrast, Classes A-D assume that 
nothing less than full mission success and functionality 
are acceptable. 
The team and the wider organization see that the 
mission is a low-cost, in-house, component-
demonstration experiment that is most likely to be 
cheaper to test, fly and re-fly than to design-analyze-
test-fly once, assuming launch windows-of-opportunity 
(i.e. free to the mission program) are used. It would be a 
relatively low-profile mission within the organization. 
Therefore they accept a minimum mission success MA 
profile where verification and validation is mostly 
achieved through test rather than design and analysis. 
USE CASE 2: Competing objectives/constraints 
influencing the mission assurance posture. 
A university team is looking to build their second 
satellite. They have some practices and processes in 
place based on success with the previous project, but 
the team developing this particular satellite is mostly 
new. Approximately 80% of the team will turnover 
within two years. The number one priority of the 
professor overseeing the team is student education of 
system engineering fundamentals, but in an effort to 
fund said education she has partnered with Company X 
to fly their newest never-before-flown product and with 
Launch Provider Y on their first flight of their rocket. 
Company X wants to make sure this product has a 
successful on-orbit demonstration, as it will increase 
their ability to sell it to paying customers, but does not 
have the resources to fully finance their own mission 
and launch. Paying customers are not yet ready to take 
a chance on this unproven technology for their mission. 
Launch Provider Y believes in supporting the next 
generation of students and is happy to help where 
possible, but will not alter their schedule to 
accommodate this mission if the university team’s 
schedule slips. 
Use Case 2 is an example of the small satellite 
community’s willingness to team, but also highlights 
the mixture of skill sets (i.e. students to professionals), 
expectations and constraints a combined team may face. 
Figure 4 shows how this particular mission settled on 
its assurance posture. 
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Figure 4: Use Case 2 negotiated mission assurance result
Each mission partner has different expectations of 
acceptable outcomes and in the discussion of what 
approach to take, schedule and educational constraints 
were prioritized over traditional expectations of mission 
success. With launch costs a non-trivial driver for both 
the university and company, both were incentivized to 
find a solution that would meet their constraints even if 
it meant compromising on ideal outcomes. Had 
Company X not been able to mitigate risk through 
additional missions with other universities, they would 
have had to make the choice of whether to have 
confidence in the vehicle/assurance up to survival or 
wait for a future opportunity more in-line with their 
expectations at the cost of delayed product release. If 
Company X decided not to proceed, the university 
professor would have to decide whether educational or 
technical de-scoping options were available to match 
the funding available or seek alternate partnerships 
which may risk the team’s ability to meet the Launch 
Provider’s non-negotiable schedule. This use case 
shows that by having the extended mission assurance 
definitions, small satellite teams are able to articulate a 
larger range of acceptable on-orbit performance driven 
by prioritized constraints. 
USE CASE 3: Constellation versus individual satellite 
mission assurance. 
Company X plans to field a constellation of satellites 
and is working through two funding phases. Phase 1 is 
a proof-of-concept demonstration for one satellite. The 
primary goal of the demonstration is to help settle some 
on-orbit performance considerations. A secondary goal 
is to help investors assess the prospects of future 
success. Phase 2 would field the final constellation and 
include as-needed design, AI&T and mission operations 
updates based on Phase 1 results. Time is of the essence 
for Company X: other companies are considering 
entering this market and investors want to see progress 
towards a return on their investment. In Phase 1, both 
investors and mission developers are willing to work 
with imperfect functionality as long as a path to 
planned functionality can be developed for Phase 2. In 
this phase, the time constraint may have a high priority 
and with future plans to put more satellites on-orbit, 
Company X might choose a lower mission assurance 
approach to realize near-term results and maintain 
momentum. Perhaps achieving survival of the first set 
of vehicles is sufficient to meet near-term goals. In 
Phase 2, to save money and time, Company X may look 
for a mixed mission assurance approach. They may ask 
themselves questions1 such as: 
• Can we spend a lot of time testing one space 
vehicle prior to launch to rule out systematic 
failures (i.e. Full Mission Success), but lessen 
                                                          
1 The questions for fictional Use Case 3 are 
inspired/adapted from Ref. 12. The authors of this paper 
do not intend to imply that the authors of Ref. 12 have 
knowledge of or agree with this approach. 
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our testing requirements for the bulk of our 
satellites (i.e. Survival or Minimum Mission 
Success assurance profiles)? 
• Can we phase our constellation production and 
launches such that we can improve later 
designs if issues are discovered on orbit (i.e. 
Full Mission Success assurance through on-
orbit testing/demonstration instead of purely 
ground assurance practices)? 
In these instances, each spacecraft would not 
necessarily be tested at the same levels to achieve high-
certainty with respect to mission assurance, but 
solutions to achieving company goals within the 
context of their identified and prioritized constraints 
may still be possible. 
USE CASE 4: Cost and schedule reduction by 
decreasing external oversight. 
The above use cases demonstrate the balance between 
mission needs as well as technical and programmatic 
constraints. One other major element of the taxonomy 
from Table 1 is the ability to keep key decision points 
closer to the mission implementers.  
Program X wants to demonstrate a new satellite data 
collection method given limited funding resources 
within just two or three years of starting the program. 
While good design practices are encouraged and high 
confidence in mission success is desired, the available 
funding and personnel availability for Program X is 
minimal. In the end, the needs of Program X are to fund 
mission(s) that provide the program the necessary data, 
not to follow and guide the spacecraft development.  
Program X decides to develop the most risky elements 
(e.g. the detectors) through a more rigorous prototype 
development prior to building flight units; however, the 
rest of the hardware is accepted as small satellite COTS 
and does not undergo similar development. The 
managers of Program X follow a mission assurance 
profile of Full Mission Success for the detectors, but 
only require a survival profile for the vehicle assuming 
that previous design efforts have demonstrated adequate 
likelihood of success. Further, the managers of Program 
X only hold formal critical design reviews for the 
detectors and vehicles and allow for internal vendor 
practices on hardware development, thus reducing 
significant development time and cost. 
Best Practices 
Mission assurance, for many institutions, incorporates 
best practices into engineering efforts. While these are 
not close to exhaustive, these lessons have been taken 
from lessons learned across multiple small satellite 
builders, and also include the University Nanosatellite 
Program’s lessons learned. 
MAINTAIN SCOPE. Assuring mission success 
starts with a well-defined scope that pays serious 
attention to, and is bounded by, the capabilities of 
the various small satellite form factors that can be 
utilized. Generally accepting on-market capabilities 
while only driving 1-2 aspects of the design often 
greatly simplifies and adds mission assurance; again, 
constraint driven and not requirement driven. 
DESIGN FOR TUMBLE. Every small satellite 
tumbles at some point in its mission. Designing the 
power system and communications system (near omni-
directional antenna pattern, baud rate scaling) to be 
operational in the majority of potential tumble 
orientations greatly increases survivability in off-
nominal cases. 
CREATE AND VERIFY WELL BEHAVED SAFE 
MODE, RE-PROGRAMMABILITY. Safe mode 
should be simple and power positive in the tumble state. 
This safe mode should be well vetted and verified that it 
does as intended. Flight software, and subsystem 
software if possible, should be reprogrammable from 
the ground since small satellites have categorically had 
issues completing software validation and verification. 
Further, re-programmability has saved multiple 
spacecraft from being lost or not completing their 
missions. 
DESIGN FOR FULL POWER RESETS ON 
HARDWARE. Since most small satellites accept 
hardware that has little radiation performance 
characterization, the simplest fix is to be able to reset 
hardware, especially the flight computer. Full power 
cycling must be possible without access to the flight 
computer (i.e. through watchdog reset, the radio and/or 
power system). Ideally, full power cycling (switching) 
of the subsystems is possible from the ground. 
TESTING. It is imperative that ALL vehicles go 
through significant testing, starting early in 
development, because any incompatibilities and 
improper assumptions made during design are 
vetted by means of testing. Workmanship, design 
flaws, and software mistakes are all found through a 
rigorous testing campaign; these are the primary 
problems seen in small satellite systems. It is 
reasonable to dedicate about half of the overall schedule 
to testing of hardware. (Even in the most aggressively 
scheduled missions, about a third of the development 
time has been in testing.) Outside of common 
environmental testing and functional testing, SSP and 
the University Nanosatellite Program require the 
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following four tests for all their vehicles, with a fifth 
that is required for systems with attitude control. Note 
these are referenced in Table 1 with the various test 
numbers (1) to (5) in the Example Practices column. 
1. Long Range Communications Test: verifies 
that the spacecraft can communicate with the 
ground station, at far field RF ranges. The 
radio is assembled in the structure during the 
test to account for the effects of the structure 
and other components. 
2. Complete Charge-Discharge Cycle: includes 
draining the battery to its depth of discharge 
via spacecraft operations and then recharging 
the battery through the spacecraft’s solar 
panels and regulators. The test demonstrates 
an autonomous recognition of when depth of 
discharge of the battery has been reached. This 
should be followed by an autonomous 
transition to a safe/non-discharging mode. The 
test should also demonstrate a charging of the 
battery, autonomously recognizing when the 
battery is fully charged, and autonomously 
ceasing charging demonstrating Peak Power 
Tracker/charging circuitry. 
3. Command Execution Test: executes every 
command that will be sent to the spacecraft. 
Ensures that the commands work and do not 
put the spacecraft into any unknown error 
states. All commands should be sent to the 
spacecraft and an effort be made to observe the 
spacecraft’s physical response to the command 
(meaning not only the successful transmission, 
but also execution). Depending upon MA 
thoroughness not every permutation of a 
command is tested, but every class of 
command should be verified. Further, all 
internal commanding of the flight computer to 
subsystems should be demonstrated (e.g. 
voltage and current thresholds on the power 
system for different operations modes). These 
should be tested in operational use cases if 
configuration changes from system modes. In 
some cases off nominal commanding should 
be executed. 
4. Day in the Life: includes spacecraft 
initialization (i.e. spacecraft separation and 
turn-on scenario), executing modes and 
appropriate commands, as well as a turn-off 
command from the ground. Not every ground 
command needs to be executed in the DitL, 
but the DitL should go through every 
spacecraft mode and scenario. DitL should 
encompass any nominal commands as 
expressed in the most current version of the 
concept of operations document. Test 
initialization should simulate launch vehicle 
separation and run through commissioning and 
checkouts of the spacecraft, then through a full 
experiment plan for the mission. It should last 
at least 24 hours. 
5. Sun Pointing Demonstration: includes 
polarity/direction testing of all sensors and 
actuators to ensure they are correctly 
assembled and mapped in flight software. A 1-
D air bearing test is preferred to demonstrate, 
but not quantify, that the vehicle correctly 
tracks a bright light showing functionality of 
the sun tracking determination and control. 
CONCLUSIONS 
What this paper describes and begins to propose is a set 
of mission assurance profiles that expand the current 
language of mission assurance. This new architecture 
does not replace the old Class A-D as those are valid, 
even for small satellites, for some types of missions. 
Further, this new architecture is still to be defined and 
the taxonomy presented is not a complete or final 
representation. The approach is only proposed and has 
not been approved by the Air Force. However, it is 
proposed that: 
• New mission assurance profiles need to be 
created that represent constraint driven 
mission sets. 
• These new assurance profiles should heavily 
weight constraints as being equal-to, or 
greater-than, science or technology objectives. 
• At mission conception, a clear scope and broad 
understanding of constraints help drive the 
implemented MA profiles to practices that 
have the greatest return-on-investment. 
• Constraint based MA is driven by the 
technical, programmatic and approval 
authority/oversight environment. Generally 
more constrained missions allow decisions in 
all areas to be made closer to the project 
implementers. 
As a final remark, while outside the scope of this paper, 
the small satellite community should consider if there is 
a minimum bar for the implementation of mission 
assurance, especially as space policies evolve to 
encompass the small satellite expansion. 
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